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Abstract
Walsh (2003) argued that U.S. monetary policy can be described as following a "speed limit"
policy. Here I show that this provides an explanation for the apparent interest rate smoothing
present in central bank policy.
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Walsh (2003) argued that U.S. monetary policy can be described as following a “speed
limit” policy, where the output gap is replaced by the change in the output gap in the loss
function of the central bank. He demonstrates that this moves the discretionary policy
in the direction of the optimal commitment solution and argues that it is consistent with
the language used by members of the Federal Open Market Committee to describe the
policy process. Here, I show that a speed limit policy solves a puzzle in the monetary
policy literature: the apparent importance in interest rate smoothing as an objective for
monetary policy (Cobham 2003; Ozlale 2003). Speed limit policies and smoothing interest
rates are shown to be observationally equivalent in a simple New Keynesian model. This
explanation is complementary to existing explanations for interest rate smoothing in the
literature: the serial correlation of shocks (Rudebusch 2002), and the use of real-time data
in monetary policy decisions (Lansing 2002). A speed limit policy is also contrasted with
a price level target, which has also been shown to improve discretionary policy outcomes
(Vestin 2000).
2. The Model
Suppose, as in Vestin (2000), Walsh (2003), and Yetman (2003, 2004), that the econ-
omy consists of a Phillips curve given by
πt = βEt(πt+1)+κxt + ut, (1)
where πt is inﬂation, xt is the output gap and ut is an exogenous shock term that is known
by the central bank. Expectations of future inﬂation are assumed rational, and all variables
are expressed in logs.





[(πt+i − π∗)2 + λx2
t+i], (2)
subject to (1), for some inﬂation target π∗. Under discretionary policy, the central bank is
assumed to lack the means to commit to future policy actions. Optimal monetary policy
will therefore minimize the period loss function, taking the form
xt =
κ(1 − β)





while inﬂation evolves according to
πt =
κ2



























t−1 + π∗. The appropriate quadratic period loss function is then given by
LP
t =( pt − p∗
t)2 + λx2
t, (6)
where λ is appropriately scaled to reﬂect the diﬀerence between the magnitude of price
level and inﬂation rate volatility. In contrast to inﬂation targeting, today’s policy aﬀects
losses in future periods, implying the presence of state variables in the model. Following
the methodology of Currie and Levine (1993), the paths of output and inﬂation under
optimal discretionary monetary policy may be deﬁned by








κ2(1 + βν1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2,
θ2 = −
κ(1 + βν1)[βφ2 − (1 − β)π∗]+κβν2(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βν1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2 ,
φ1 =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)
κ2(1 + βν1)+λ(1 + β − βφ1)2,
φ2 =
λ(1 + β − βφ1)[βφ2 − (1 − β)π∗] − κ2βν2




ν2 =( 1+βν1)φ1φ2 + λθ1θ2 + βν2φ1.
To examine monetary policy with a speed limit policy, the appropriate quadratic
period loss function is
LS
t =( πt − π∗)2 + λ(xt − xt−1)2, (9)
where λ should again be scaled to reﬂect the diﬀerence between the magnitude of output
gap volatility and the volatility of the change in the output gap. As in Walsh (2003), the
paths of output and inﬂation under optimal discretionary monetary policy may be deﬁned
by
xt = ξ0 + ξ1xt−1 + ξ2ut, (10)
πt = ζ0 + ζ1xt−1 + ζ2ut, (11)
ξ0 =
(βζ1 + κ)(π∗ − βζ0) − βρ2








(βζ1 + κ)2 + λ + βρ1
,
ζ0 = βζ0 +( βζ1 + κ)ξ0,
ζ1 =( βζ1 + κ)ξ1,
ζ2 =( βζ1 + κ)ξ2 +1 ,
ρ1 =
ζ2





ζ1(ζ0 − π∗)+λξ0(ξ1 − 1) + βρ1ξ0ξ1
1 − βξ1
.
To investigate the relationship between interest rate smoothing and the period loss
function of the central bank, consider an IS curve given by
xt = −γ(rt − r∗), (12)
where r∗ is the natural real interest rate, and rt is assumed to be the policy instrument of
the central bank. Then it is straight-forward to show that the period loss functions may
be re-written as
LI
t =( πt − π∗)2 + λγ2(rt − r∗)2, (13)
LP
t =( pt − p∗
t)2 + λγ2(rt − r∗)2, (14)
LS
t =( πt − π∗)2 + λγ2(rt − rt−1)2. (15)
Clearly a speed limit policy is consistent with interest-rate smoothing, while either a price
level or inﬂation target is consistent with minimizing the volatility of real interest rates
about their natural level. However, because a price level target embeds history dependence
within the price level objective, it is not clear whether a price level target results in
increased or decreased real interest rate smoothing relative to the other policies.
3. Results and Conclusions
To further investigate the relationship between these diﬀerent types of loss function
and interest rate smoothing, we plot inﬂation volatility against volatility in the change of
the interest rate for diﬀerent values of λ. The parameters considered here are the same as
in Vestin (2000) and Yetman (2003, 2004): κ = 1
3; β =1 ;π∗ = 0; and 0 ≤ λ ≤∞ .T h e
results are given in Figure 1 for the real interest rate and Figure 2 for the nominal interest
rate. It is clear that by either measure, a price level target or a speed limit policy will
result in an apparent increase in interest rate smoothing relative to that which would be
achieved with an inﬂation target. Evidence of interest rate smoothing can be interpreted
as evidence of price level targeting or a speed limit policy for the conduct of monetary
policy under discretion.
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